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Abstract 
Statistical disclosure control refers to the methodology used in the design of the statistical outputs from a 
survey for protecting the confidentiality of respondents’ answers.  The threat to confidentiality is 
assumed to come from a hypothetical intruder who has access to these outputs and seeks to use them to 
disclose information about a survey respondent. One key concern relates to identity disclosure, which 
would occur if the intruder were able to link a known individual (or other unit) to an element of the 
output.  Another main concern relates to attribute disclosure, which would occur if the intruder could 
determine the value of some survey variable for an identified individual (or other unit) using the statistical 
output. Measures of the probability of disclosure are called disclosure risk. If this level of risk is deemed 
unacceptable then it may be necessary to apply a method of statistical disclosure control to the output. 
The choice of which method and how much protection to apply depends not just on the impact on 
disclosure risk but also on the impact on the utility of the output to users. This paper provides a review of 
statistical disclosure control methodology for two main types of survey output: (i) tables of estimates of 
population parameters and (ii) microdata, often released as a rectangular file of variables by analysis 
units. For each of these types of output, the definition and estimation of disclosure risk is discussed as 
well as methods for statistical disclosure control.   1 
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statistical disclosure control to the output. The choice of which method and how much 
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estimation of disclosure risk is discussed as well as methods for statistical disclosure 
control. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
1.1. The problem of statistical disclosure control 
Survey respondents are usually provided with an assurance that their responses will 
be treated confidentially. These assurances may relate to the way their responses will be 
handled within the agency conducted the survey or they may relate to the nature of the 
statistical outputs of the survey as, for example, in the ‘confidentiality guarantee’ in the 
United Kingdom (UK) National Statistics Code of Practice (National Statistics, 2004, 
p.7) that ‘no statistics will be produced that are likely to identify an individual’. This 
paper is concerned with methods for ensuring that the latter kinds of assurances are met. 
Thus,  in  the  context  of  this  paper,  statistical  disclosure  control  (SDC)  refers  to  the 
methodology  employed,  in  the  design  of  the  statistical  outputs  from  the  survey,  for 
protecting the confidentiality of respondents’ answers. Methods relating to the first kind 
of assurance, for example computer security and staff protocols for the management of 
data within the survey agency, fall outside the scope of this paper. 
There are various kinds of statistical outputs from surveys. The most traditional are 
tables of descriptive estimates, such as totals, means and proportions. The release of such   2 
estimates from surveys of households and individuals have typically not been considered 
to  represent  a  major  threat  to  confidentiality,  in  particular  because  of  the  protection 
provided  by  sampling.  Tabular  outputs  from  the  kinds  of  establishment  surveys 
conducted by government have, however, long been deemed risky, especially because of 
the threat of disclosure of information about large businesses in cells of tables which are 
sampled with a 100% sampling fraction. SDC methods for such tables have a long history 
and will be outlined in Section 2.  
  While the traditional model of delivering all the estimates from a survey in a single 
report  continues  to  meet  certain  needs,  there  has  been  increasing  demand  for  more 
flexible survey outputs, often for multiple users, where the set of population parameters 
of interest is not pre-specified. There are several reasons why it may not be possible to 
pre-specify all the parameters. Data analysis is an iterative process and what analyses are 
of most interest may only become clear after initial exploratory analyses of the data.  
Moreover,  given  the  considerable  expense  of  running  surveys,  it  is  natural  for  many 
commissioners of surveys to seek to facilitate the use of the data by multiple users. But it 
is usually impossible to pre-specify all possible users and their needs in advance.  A 
natural way to provide flexible outputs from a survey to address such needs is to make 
the survey microdata available so that users can carry out the statistical analyses that 
interest them. 
The  release  of  such  microdata  raises  serious  confidentiality  protection  issues, 
however. Of course, statistical analyses of survey data do not require that the identities of 
the survey units are known. Names, addresses and contact information for individuals or 
establishment can be stripped from the data to form an anonymised microdata file. The 
problem,  however,  is  that  such  basic  anonymisation  is  often  insufficient  to  protect 
confidentiality,  and  it  is  necessary  therefore  to  employ  one  of  a  range  of  alternative 
approaches to SDC and this will be discussed further in Section 3.  
   
1.2 Concepts of confidentiality, disclosure and disclosure risk 
To be precise about what is meant by ‘protecting confidentiality’ requires discussion 
of definitions. These usually involve the notion of a hypothetical intruder who might seek 
to  breach  confidentiality.  There  are  thus  three  key  parties:  (i)  the  respondent  who 
provides the data, (ii) the agency which collects the data, releases statistical outputs and 
designs the SDC strategy, and (iii) the hypothetical intruder who has access to these 
outputs  and  seeks  to  use  them  to  disclose  information  about  the  respondent.  One 
important notion of disclosure is identity disclosure or identification, which would occur 
if the intruder linked a known individual (or other unit) to an individual microdata record 
or other element of the statistical output. Another important notion is attribute disclosure, 
which would occur if the intruder could determine the value of some survey variable for 
an  identified  individual  (or  other  unit)  using  the  statistical  output.  More  generally, 
prediction disclosure would occur if the intruder could predict the value of some survey 
variable for an identified individual with some uncertainty.  When assessing the potential 
for disclosure for a particular statistical output, it is usual to refer to the disclosure risk. 
This might be defined as the probability of disclosure with respect to specified sources of 
uncertainty. Or the term might be used loosely to emphasize not only the uncertainty 
about potential disclosure but also the potential harm that might arise from disclosure 
(Lambert, 1993). The confidentiality of the answers provided by a respondent might be   3 
said to be protected if the disclosure risk for this respondent and the respondent’s answers 
is sufficiently low.  We shall discuss disclosure risk in more detail in sections 2 and 3. 
For further discussion of definitions of disclosure see Duncan and Lambert (1986; 1989) 
and Skinner (1992). 
 
1.3 Approaches to protecting confidentiality 
If the disclosure risk is not deemed to be sufficiently low, then it will be necessary to 
employ some method to reduce the risk. There are broadly two approaches, which are 
referred  to  here  as  safe  setting  and  safe  data  (Marsh  et  al.  1994).  The  safe  setting 
approach imposes restrictions on the set of possible users of the statistical output and/or 
on the ways that the output can be used. For example, users might be required to sign a 
licencing  agreement  or  might  only  be  able  to  access  microdata  by  visiting  a  secure 
laboratory or by submitting requests remotely (National Research Council, 2005). The 
safe  data  approach,  on  the  other  hand,  involves  some  modification  to  the  statistical 
output. For example, the degree of geographical detail in a microdata file from a national 
social survey might be limited so that no area containing less than 100,000 households is 
identified.  In  this  paper  we  focus  on  the  safe  data  approach  and  generally  refer  to 
methods for modifying the statistical output as SDC methods.  
 
1.4 SDC methods, utility and data quality 
SDC  methods  vary  according  to  the  form  of  the  statistical  output.  Some  simple 
approaches are: 
-  reduction  of  detail,  for  example  the  number  of  categories  of  a  categorical 
variable might be reduced in a cross-classified table or in microdata; 
-  suppression, for example the entry in a table might be replaced by an asterisk, 
indicating that the entry has been suppressed for confidentiality reasons. 
In each of these cases, the SDC method will lead to some loss of information for the 
user of the statistical output. Thus, the method will reduce the number of population 
parameters for which a user can obtain survey estimates. Other kinds of SDC methods 
might not affect the number of parameters which can be estimated but may affect the 
quality of the estimates that can be produced. For example, if random noise is added to an 
income variable to protect confidentiality then this may induce bias or variance inflation 
in associated survey estimates. The general term utility may be used to cover both the 
information provided by the statistical outputs, e.g. the range of estimates or analyses 
which can be produced, and the quality of this information, e.g. the extent of errors in 
these estimates. It should, of course, be recognized that survey data are subject to many 
sources of error, even prior to the application of SDC methods, and the impact of SDC 
methods on data quality therefore needs to be considered in this context.    
Utility  generally  needs  to  be  considered  from  the  perspective  of  a  user  of  the 
statistical outputs, who represents a key fourth party to add to the three parties referred to 
earlier: the respondent, the agency and the intruder.  
 
1.5 SDC as an optimisation problem: the risk-utility trade-off 
The key challenge in SDC is how to deal with the trade-off between disclosure risk 
and utility. In general, the more the disclosure risk is reduced by an SDC method, the 
lower will be the expected utility of the output. This trade-off may be formulated as an   4 
optimisation  problem.  Let  D  be  the  (anonymized)  survey  data  and  let ( ) f D ,  be  the 
statistical output, resulting from the use of an SDC method. Let  [ ( )] R f D  be a measure of 
the disclosure risk of the output and let   [ ( )] U f D  be a measure of the utility of the 
output.  Then  the  basic  challenge  of  SDC  might  be  represented  as  the  constrained 
optimisation problem : 
 
for given  D and ε , find an SDC method,  (.) f , which: 
 
maximises  [ ( )] U f D , subject to  [ ( )] R f D ε < . 
 
The elements of this problem need some clarification: 
(.) f  : the SDC method - a wide variety of these have been proposed and we shall refer to 
some of these in this paper; 
(.) R : the disclosure risk function - we shall discuss ways in which this function may be 
defined; this is certainly not straightforward, e.g. because of its dependence on 
assumptions about the intruder  and because of the challenge of combining the 
threats of disclosure for multiple respondents into a scalar function; 
(.) U : the utility function - this will also not be straightforward to specify as a scalar 
function, given the potential multiple uses of the output; 
ε     maximum acceptable risk:  in principle, one might expect the agency to provide this 
value in the light of its assurances to respondents. However, in practice, agencies 
find it very difficult to specify a value of ε , other than zero, i.e. no disclosure risk. 
Unfortunately, for most definitions of disclosure risk, the only way to achieve no 
disclosure risk is by not releasing any output and this is rarely a solution of interest!     
Given  these  difficulties  in  specifying  (.) R   and  (.) U   as  scalar  functions  and  in 
specifying a value for  ε , the above optimization problem serves mainly as conceptual 
motivation.  In  practice,  different  SDC  methods  can  be  evaluated  and  compared  by 
considering the values of alternative measures of risk and utility. For given measures of 
each, it can sometimes be useful to construct an RU map (Duncan et al., 2001), where a 
measure of risk is plotted against a measure of utility for a set of candidate SDC methods. 
The points on this map are expected to display a general positive relationship beween risk 
and utility, but one might still find that, for given values of risk, some methods have 
greater utility than others and thus are to be preferred. This approach avoids having to 
assume a single value of ε . 
 
2. Tabular Outputs 
 
2.1 Disclosure risk in social surveys and the protection provided by sampling 
The main developments in SDC methods for tabular outputs have been motivated by 
the potential risks of disclosure arising when 100% sampling has been employed, such as 
in censuses or in administrative data.  Frequency tables based upon such data sources 
may often include small counts, as low as zero or one, e.g. in tables of numbers of deaths 
by area by cause of death. Such tables might lead to identity disclosure, e.g. if it is public 
knowledge that someone has died, then it might be possible to identify that person as a 
count  of  one  in  a  table  of  deaths  using  some  known  characteristics  of  that  person.   5 
Attribute disclosure might also occur. For example, it might be possible to find out the 
cause  of  the  person’s  death  if  the  table  cross-classifies  this  cause  by  other  variables 
potentially known to an intruder. 
In social surveys, however, the use of sampling greatly reduces the risks of such kinds 
of disclosure for two reasons. Firstly, the presence of sampling requires different kinds of 
statistical outputs. Thus, the entries in tables for categorical variables tend to be weighted 
proportions (possibly within domains defined by rows or columns) and not unweighted 
sample counts.  Even if a user of the table could work out the cell counts (e.g. because the 
survey employs equal weights and the sample base has been provided), the survey agency 
will often ensure that the published cells do not contain very small counts, where the 
estimates would be deemed too unreliable due to sampling error. For example, the agency 
might suppress cell entries where the sample count in the cell falls below some threshold, 
e.g. 50 persons in a national social survey.  This should prevent the kinds of situations of 
most  concern  with  100%  data.    Sometimes,  agencies  use  techniques  of  small  area 
estimation in domains with small sample counts and these techniques may also act to 
reduce disclosure risk.  
Secondly,  the  presence  of  sampling  should  reduce  the  precision  with  which  an 
intruder could achieve predictive disclosure. For example, suppose that an intruder could 
find out from a survey table that, among 100 respondents falling into a certain domain, 99 
of them have a certain attribute and suppose that the intruder knows someone in the 
population who falls into this domain. Then the intruder cannot predict that this person 
has the attribute with probability 0.99, since this person need not be a respondent and 
prediction is subject to sampling uncertainty. This conclusion depends, however, on the 
identities of the survey respondents being kept confidential by the agency, preventing the 
intruder  knowing  whether  the  known  person  is  a respondent,  referred  to  as  response 
knowledge by Bethlehem et al. (1980).  In general, it seems very important that agencies 
do adopt this practice since it greatly reduces disclosure risk, while not affecting the 
statistical utility of the outputs. In some exceptional cases, it may be difficult to achieve 
this  completely.  For example,  in  a  survey  of  children  it  will  usually be  necessary  to 
obtain the consent of a child’s parent (or other adult) in order for the child to take part in 
the survey.  The child might be assured that their responses will be kept confidential from 
their parent. However, when examining the outputs of the survey, the parent (as intruder) 
would know that their child was a respondent.   
For the reasons given above, disclosure will not generally be of concern in the release 
of tables of estimates from social surveys, where the sample inclusion probabilities are 
small (say never exceeding 0.1). See also Federal Committee on Statistical Methodology 
(2005, pp. 12-14). 
 
2.2. Disclosure risk in establishment surveys 
A  common  form  of  output  from  an  establishment  survey  consists  of  a  table  of 
estimated totals, cross-classified by characteristics of the establishment. Each estimate 
takes the form  ˆ
c i ci i s Y wI y =∑ , where  i w  is the survey weight,  ci I  is a 0-1 indicator for 
cell c in the cross-classification and  i y  is the survey variable for the i
th establishment in 
the samples.  For example,  i y  might be a measure of output and the cells might be 
formed by cross-classifying industrial activity and a measure of size.    6 
The  relevant  definition  of  disclosure  in  such  a  setting  will  often  be  a  form  of 
prediction disclosure. Prediction disclosure for a specific cell c might be defined under 
the following set-up and assumptions: 
- the intruder is one of the establishments in the cell which has the aim of predicting 
the value i y  for one of the other establishments in the cell or, more generally, the 
intruder consists of a coalition of m of the  c N  establishments in the cell with the same 
predictive aim; 
- the intruder knows the identities of all establishments within the cell (since, for 
example, they might represent businesses competing in a similar market). 
Given such assumptions, prediction disclosure might be said to occur if the intruder is 
able to predict the value   i y  with a specified degree of precision.  In order to clarify the 
notion of precision, we focus in the next subsection on the important case where the units 
in the cell all fall within completely enumerated strata. Thus,  1 i w =  when  1 ci I =  so that 
ˆ
c c i U Y y =∑ , where  c U  is the set of all establishments in cell c and  c N  is the size of  c U .  
In this case the intruder faces no uncertainty due to sampling and this might therefore be 
treated as the worst case.  
 
2.2.1 Prediction disclosure in the absence of sampling     
In  the  absence  of  sampling,  prediction  is  normally  considered  from  a  deterministic 
perspective and is represented by an interval (between an upper and lower bound) within 
which  the  intruder  knows  that  a  value  i y   must  lie.  The  precision  of  prediction  is 
represented by the difference between the true value and one of the bounds. It is supposed 
that the intruder undertakes prediction by combining prior information with the reported 
value  ˆ
c Y .  
One  approach  to  specifying  the  prior  information  is  used  in  the  prior-posterior  rule 
(Willenborg  and  de  Waal,  2001),  also  called  the  pq  rule,  which  depends  upon  two 
constants, p and q, set by the agency. The constant q is used to specify the precision of 
prediction based upon the prior information alone. Under the pq rule, it is assumed that 
intruder can infer the  i y  value for each establishment in the cell to within q%. Thus, the 
agency assumes that, prior to the table being published, the intruder could know that a 
value  i y  falls within the interval[(1 /100) ,(1 /100) ] i i q y q y − + . The combination of this 
prior information with the output ˆ
c c i U Y y =∑  can then be used by the intruder to obtain 
sharper  bounds  on  a  true  value.  For  example,  let  (1) (2) ( ) ...
c N y y y ≤ ≤ ≤   be  the  order 
statistics and suppose that the intruder is the establishment with the second largest value, 
( 1) c N y − . Then this intruder can determine an upper bound for the largest value  ( ) c N y  by 
subtracting  its  own  value  ( 1) c N y −   together  with  the  sum  of  the  lower  bounds  for 
(1) ( 2) ,...,
c N y y −  from  ˆ
c Y . The precision of prediction using this upper bound is given by 
difference between this upper bound and the true value ( ) c N y , which is 
2
( ) 1 ( /100)
c N
i i q y
−
= ∑ . 
This  cell  would  be  called  sensitive  under  the  pq  rule,  i.e.  judged  disclosive,  if  this 
difference was less than p% of the true value, i.e. if  
   7 
2
( ) ( ) 1 ( /100) ( /100) 0
c
c
N
N i i p y q y
−
= − > ∑ .      (1) 
 
The expression on the left hand side of (1) is a special case of a linear sensitivity 
measure, which more generally takes the form ( ) 1
c N
c i i i R a y = =∑ , where the  i a  are specified 
weights. The cell is said to be sensitive if  0 c R > . In this case, prediction disclosure 
would be deemed to occur. A widely used special case of the pq rule is the p% rule, 
which  arises  from  setting  q=100,  i.e.  no  prior  information  is  assumed.  Another 
commonly used linear sensitivity measure arises with the (n,k) or dominance rule. See 
Willenborg and de Waal (2001), Cox (2001), Giessing (2001) and Federal Committee on 
Statistical Methodology (2005) for further discussion.  
 
2.2.2 Prediction disclosure in the presence of sampling     
More generally, all cell units may not be completely enumerated. In this case,  ˆ
c Y  will 
be  subject  to  sampling  error  and,  in  general,  this  will  lead  to  additional  disclosure 
protection, provided the intruder does not know whether other establishments (other than 
those in the coalition) are sampled or not.  The definition of risk in this setting appears to 
need further research. Willenborg and de Waal (2001, section 6.2.5) present some ideas. 
An alternative model-based stochastic approach might assume that before the release of 
the table, the prior information about the  i y  can be represented by a linear regression 
model depending upon publicly available covariate values  i x  with a specified residual 
variance. The predictive distribution of  i y   given  i x  could then be updated using the 
known value(s) of  i y  for the intruder and the reported  ˆ
c Y , which might be assumed to 
follow the distribution  ˆ ˆ [ , ( )] c c c Y N Y v Y ∼ , where  ˆ ( ) c v Y  is the reported variance estimate of 
ˆ
c Y .  Prediction  disclosure  could  then  be  measured  in  terms  of  the  resulting  residual 
variance in the prediction of  i y . 
 
2.3. SDC methods for tabular outputs 
If a cell in a table is deemed sensitive, i.e. the cell value represents an unacceptably high 
disclosure risk, a number of SDC approaches may be used.  
Redefinition of cells: The cells are redefined to remove sensitive cells, e.g. by combining 
sensitive  cells  with  other  cells  or  by  combining  categories  of  the  cross-classified 
variables. This is also called table redesign (Willenborg and de Waal, 2001). 
Cell suppression: the value of a sensitive cell is suppressed. Depending upon the nature 
of the table and its published margins, it may also be necessary to suppress the values of 
‘complementary’ cells to prevent an intruder being able to deduce the value of the cell 
from  other  values  in  the  table.  There  is  a large  literature  on  approaches  to  choosing 
complementary  cells  which  ensure  disclosure  protection.  See  e.g.  Willenborg  and  de 
Waal (2001), Cox (2001) and Giessing (2001) and references therein. 
Cell modification: the cell values may be modified in some way. It will generally be 
necessary to modify not only the values in the sensitive cells but also values in some 
complementary  non-sensitive  cells,  for  the  same  reason  as  in  cell  suppression. 
Modification may be deterministic, e.g. Cox et al. (2004), or stochastic, e.g. Willenborg   8 
and de Waal (2001, Sect. 9.2). A simple method is rounding, where the modified cell 
values are multiples of a given base integer (Willenborg and de Waal, 2001, Ch. 9). This 
method is more commonly applied to frequency tables derived from 100% data but can 
also be applied to tables of estimated totals from surveys, where the base integer may be 
chosen according to the magnitudes of the estimated totals. Instead of replacing the cell 
values by single safe values, it is also possible to replace the values by intervals, defined 
by lower and upper bounds (Salazar, 2003; Giessing and Dittrich, 2006). The method of 
controlled tabular adjustment (Cox et al.,2004) determines modified cell values within 
such bounds so that the table remains additive and certain safety and statistical properties 
are met. 
Pre-tabular  microdata  modification:  instead  of  modifying  the  cell  values,  the 
underlying microdata may be perturbed, e.g. by adding noise, and then the table formed 
from the perturbed microdata (Evans, et al. 1998; Massell et al., 2006). 
The statistical output from a survey will typically include many tables. Although the 
above  methods  may  be  applied  separately  to  each  table,  such  an  approach  takes  no 
account  of  the  possible  additional  disclosure  risks  arising  from  the  combination  of 
information from different tables, in particular, from common margins. To protect against 
such  additional  risks  raises  new  considerations  for  SDC.  Moreover,  the  set  of  tables 
constituting the statistical output is not necessarily fixed, as in a traditional survey report. 
With developments in online dissemination, there is increasing demand for the generation 
of tables which can respond in a more flexible way to the needs of users. This implies the 
need to consider SDC methods which not only protect each table separately as above, but 
also protect against the risk arising from alternative possible sequences of released tables 
(see e.g. Dobra et al, 2003).      
 
3. Microdata 
 
3.1. Assessing disclosure risk 
We  suppose  the  agency  is  considering  releasing  to  researchers  an  anonymised 
microdata file, where the records of the file correspond to the basic analysis units and 
each record contains a series of survey variables. The record may also include identifiers 
for  higher  level  analysis  units,  e.g.  household  identifiers  where  the  basic  units  are 
individuals, as well as information required for survey analysis such as survey weights 
and primary sampling unit (PSU) identifiers.  
We suppose that the threat of concern is that an intruder may link a record in the file 
to some external data source of known units using some variables, which are included in 
both  the  microdata  file  and  the  external  source.  These  variables  are  often  called  key 
variables or identifying variables. There are various ways of defining disclosure risk in 
this setting. See e.g. Paass (1988) and Duncan and Lambert (1989). A common approach, 
often  motivated  by  the  nature  of  the  confidentiality  pledge,  is  to  consider  a  form  of 
identification risk (Bethlehem et al., 1990; Reiter, 2005), concerned with the possibility 
that the intruder will be able to determine a correct link between a microdata record and a 
known unit. This definition of risk will only be appropriate if the records in the microdata 
can meaningfully be said to be associated with units in the population. When microdata is 
subject to some forms of SDC, this may not be the case (e.g. if the released records are 
obtained by combining original records) and in this case it may be more appropriate to   9 
consider some definition of predictive disclosure (e.g. Fuller, 1993) although we do not 
pursue this further here.   
A number of approaches to the assessment of identification risk are possible, but all 
depend  importantly  upon  assumptions  about  the  nature  of  the  key  variables.  One 
approach is to conduct an empirical experiment, matching the proposed microdata against 
another  data  source,  which  is  treated  as  a  surrogate  for  the  data  source  held  by  the 
intruder. Having made assumptions about the key variables, the agency can use record 
linkage methods, which it is plausible would be available to an intruder, to match units 
between the two datasets. Risk might then be measured in terms of the number of units 
for which matches are achieved together with a measure of the match quality (in terms of 
the proportions of false positives and negatives). Such an experiment therefore requires 
that the agency has information which enables it to establish precisely which units are in 
common between the two sources and which are not. 
The key challenge in this approach is how to construct a realistic surrogate intruder 
dataset, for which there is some overlap of units with the microdata and the nature of this 
overlap is known. On some occasions a suitable alternative data source may be available. 
Blien  et  al.  (1992)  provide  one  example  of  a  data  source  listing  people  in  certain 
occupations. Another possibility might be a different survey undertaken by the agency, 
although agencies often control samples to avoid such overlap. Even if there is overlap, 
say with a census, determining precisely which units are in common and which are not 
may be resource intensive. Thus, this approach is unlikely to be suitable for routine use.   
In  the  absence  of  another  dataset,  the  agency  may  consider  a  re-identification 
experiment,  in  which  the  microdata  file  is  matched  against  itself  in  a  similar  way, 
possibly after the application of some SDC method (Winkler, 2004). This approach has 
the advantage that it is not model-dependent, but it is possible that the re-identification 
risk is over-estimated if the disclosure protection effects of sampling and measurement 
error are not allowed for in a realistic way.   
 In  the  remainder  of  section  3,  we  consider  a  third  approach,  which  again  only 
requires data from the microdata file, but makes theoretical assumptions, especially of a 
modelling  kind,  in  order  to  estimate  identification  risk.  As  for  the  re-identification 
experiment,  this  approach  must  make  assumptions  about  how  the  key  variables  are 
measured in the microdata and by the intruder on known units using external information. 
A  simplifying  but  ‘worst  case’  assumption  is  that  the  key  variables  are  recorded  in 
identical ways in the microdata and externally. We refer to this as the no measurement 
error assumption, since measurement error in either of the data sources may be expected 
to invalidate this assumption. If at least one of the key variables is continuous and the no 
measurement error assumption is made then an intruder who observes an exact match 
between the values of the key variables in the microdata and on the known units could 
conclude with  probability one that the match is correct, in other words the identification 
risk would be one. If at least one of the key variables is continuous and it is supposed that 
measurement error may occur then the risk will generally be below one. Moreover, an 
exact matching approach is not obviously sensible and a broader class of methods of 
record linkage might be considered. See Fuller (1993) for the assessment of disclosure 
risk under some measurement error model assumptions.     
In  practice,  variables  are  rarely  recorded  in  a  continuous  way  in  social  survey 
microdata. For example, age would rarely be coded with more detail than one year bands.   10 
And  from  now  on  we  restrict  attention  to  the  case  of  categorical  key  variables.  For 
simplicity, we restrict attention to the case of exact matching, although more general 
record linkage methods could be employed. We focus on a microdata file, where the only 
SDC  methods  which  have  been  applied  are  recoding  of  key  variables  or  random 
(sub)sampling.  We  comment  briefly  on  the impact  of other  SDC  methods  on  risk  in 
section 3.4. 
 
3.2 File-level measures of identification risk  
We consider a finite population U of  N  units (which will typically be individuals) 
and suppose the microdata file consists of records for a sample s U ⊂  of size n N ≤ . We 
assume that the possibility of statistical disclosure arises if an intruder gains access to the 
microdata and attempts to match a microdata record to external information on a known 
unit  using  the  values  of  mcategorical  key  variables  1,..., m X X .    (Note  that  s  and 
1,..., m X X  are defined after the application of (sub)sampling or recoding respectively as 
SDC methods to the original microdata file.) 
Let the variable formed by cross-classifying  1,..., m X X  be denoted  X , with values 
denoted  1,..., k K = , where  K is the number of categories or key values of  X . Each of 
these key values corresponds to a possible combination of categories of the key variables. 
Under the no measurement error assumption, identity disclosure is of particular concern 
if a record is unique in the population with respect to the key variables. A record with key 
value  k  is said to be population unique if  1 k F = , where  k F  denotes the number of units 
in U with key value  k . If an intruder observes a match with a record with key value  k , 
knows  that  the  record  is  population  unique  and  can  make  the  no  measurement  error 
assumption then the intruder can infer that the match is correct.  
As a simple measure of disclosure risk, we  might therefore consider taking some 
summary of the extent of population uniqueness. In survey sampling it is usual to define 
parameters of interest at the population level and this might lead us to define our measure 
as  the  population  proportion  1 / N N ,  where  ( ) r k k N I F r = = ∑   is  the    population 
frequencies of frequencies,  1,2,... r = . From a disclosure risk perspective, however, we 
are interested in the risk for a specific microdata file it is natural to allow the risk measure 
to  be  sample dependent. Thus,  we  might  expect the  risk  to be  higher  if  a  sample  is 
selected with a high proportion of unusual identifiable units than for a sample where this 
proportion  is  lower.  Thus,  a  more  natural  file-level  measure  is  the  proportion  of 
population uniques in the sample. Let the sample counterpart of  k F  be denoted by  k f  
then this measure can be expressed as: 
 
Pr( ) ( 1, 1)/ k k k PU I f F n = = = ∑ .          (2) 
 
It could be argued, however that the denominator of this proportion should be made even 
smaller, since the only records which might possibly be population unique are ones that 
are sample unique (since  k k f F ≤ ), i.e. have a key value  k  such that  1 k f = . Thus a more 
conservative measure would be to take: 
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1 Pr( | ) ( 1, 1)/ k k k PU SU I f F n = = = ∑ ,          (3) 
 
where  1 n  is the number of sample uniques and, more generally,  ( ) r k k n I f r = = ∑  is  the 
sample frequencies of frequencies. For further consideration of the proportion of sample 
uniques that are population unique, see Fienberg and Makov (1998) and  Samuels (1998). 
It may be argued (e.g. Skinner and Elliot, 2002) that these measures may be over-
optimistic, since they only capture the risk arising from population uniques and not from 
other records with 2 k F ≥ . If an intruder observes a match on a key value with frequency  
k F  then (subject to the no measurement error assumption) the probability that the match 
is correct is 1/ k F  under the exchangeability assumption that the intruder is equally likely 
to have selected any of the   k F  units in the population. An alternative measure of risk is 
then obtained by extending this notion of probability of correct match across different 
key values. Again, on worst case grounds, it is natural to restrict attention to sample 
uniques. One measure arises from supposing that the intruder starts with the microdata, is 
equally likely to select any sample unique and then matches this sample unique to the 
population. The probability that the resulting match is correct is then   the simple average 
of 1/ k F  across sample uniques:  
 
     1 [ ( 1)/ ]/ s k k k I f F n θ = = ∑             (4) 
 
Another measure is  
 
( 1)/ ( 1) U k k k k k I f F I f θ = = = ∑ ∑ ,          (5) 
 
which is the probability of a correct match under a scenario where the intruder searches at 
random across the population and finds a match with a sample unique.   
All the above four measures are functions of both the  k f  and the  k F . The agency 
conducting  the  survey  will  be  able  to  determine  the  sample  quantities  k f   from  the 
microdata but the population quantities  k F  will generally be unknown.  It is therefore of 
interest to be able to make inference about the measures from sample data.   
Skinner  and  Elliot  (2002)  show  that,  under  Bernoulli  sampling  with  inclusion 
probability  π , a simple design-unbiased estimator of  U θ  is 
1
1 1 2 ˆ /[ 2( 1) ] U n n n θ π
− = + − . 
They also provide a design consistent estimator for the asymptotic variance of  ˆ
U U θ θ − . 
Skinner and Carter (2003) show that a design-consistent estimator of  U θ  for an arbitrary 
complex  design  is 
1
1 1 2 2 ˆ /[ 2( 1) ] U n n n θ π
− = + − ,  where 
1
2 π
−   is  the  mean  of  the  inverse 
inclusion  probabilities 
1
i π
−   for  units  iwith  key  values  for  which  2 k f = .  They  also 
provide  a  design-consistent  estimator  of  the  asymptotic  variance  of  ˆ
U U θ θ −   under 
Poisson sampling. 
Such simple design-based inference does not seem to be possible for the other three 
measures in (2) - (4). Assuming a symmetric design such as Bernoulli sampling, we   12 
might suppose that  1 2 , ,... n n  represent sufficient statistics and seek design-based moment-
based estimators of the measures by solving the equations: 
 
( ) r t rt
t
E n N P =∑ ,      1,2,... r =  
where  the  coefficients  rt P   are  known  for  sampling  schemes  such  as  simple  random 
sampling or Bernoulli sampling (Goodman, 1949). The solution of these equations for  t N  
with  ( ) r E n  replaced by  r n  gives unbiased estimators of   K  and  1 N  under apparently 
weak conditions (Goodman, 1949). Unfortunately, Goodman found that the estimator of 
K   can  be  ‘very  unreasonable’  and  the  same  appears  to  be  so  for  the  corresponding 
estimator of  1 N . Bunge and Fitzpatrick (1993) review approaches to estimating  K  and 
discuss these difficulties. Zayatz (1991) and Greenberg and Zayatz (1992) propose an 
alternative  ‘nonparametric’  estimator  of  1 N   but  this  appears  to  be  subject  to  serious 
upward bias for small sampling fractions (Chen and Keller-McNulty, 1998). 
  One  way  of  addressing  these  estimation  difficulties  is  by  making  stronger 
modelling  assumptions,  in  particular  by  assuming  that  the  k F   are  independently 
distributed as: 
| ( ) k k k F Po λ λ ∼              (6) 
 
where  the  k λ   are  independently  and  identically  distributed,  i.e.  that  the  k F   follow  a 
compound  Poisson  distribution.  A  tractable  choice  for  the  distribution  of    k λ   is  the  
gamma distribution (Bethlehem et al., 1990) although it does not appear to fit well in 
some real data applications (e.g. Skinner et al., 1994; Chen and Keller-McNulty, 1998). 
A much better fit is provided by the log-normal (Skinner and Holmes, 1993). Samuels 
(1998) discussed estimation of   Pr( | ) PU SU  based on a Poisson-Dirichlet model.  A 
general conclusion seems to be that results can be somewhat sensitive to the choice of 
model, especially as the sampling fraction decreases, and that  U θ  can be more robustly 
estimated than the other three measures. 
 
3.3 Record-level measures of identification risk  
A concern with file-level measures is that the principles  governing  confidentiality 
protection often seek to avoid the identification of any individual, that is require the risk 
to be below a threshold for each record, and such aims may not adequately be addressed 
by aggregate measures of the form (2) - (5). To address this concern, it is more natural to 
consider record level measures, i.e.  measures which may take different values for each 
microdata record. Such measures may help identify those parts of the sample where risk 
is high and more protection is needed and may be aggregated to a file level measure in 
different  ways  if  desired  (Lambert  1993).  While  record  level  measures  may  provide 
greater  flexibility  and  insight  when  assessing  whether  specified  forms  of  microdata 
output  are  ‘disclosive’,  they  are  potentially  more  difficult  to  estimate  than  file  level 
measures. 
A  number  of  approaches  have  been  proposed  for  the  estimation  of  record  level 
measures. For continuous key variables, Fuller (1993) shows how to assess the record   13 
level  probability  of  identification  in  the  presence  of  added  noise,  under  normality 
assumptions. See also Paass (1988) and Duncan and Lambert (1989). We now consider 
related  methods  for  categorical  variables,  following  Skinner  and  Holmes  (1998)  and 
Elamir and Skinner (2006).  
Consider a microdata record with key value  X . Suppose the record is sample unique, 
i.e. with a key value  k  for which  1 k f = , since such records may be expected to be most 
risky. Suppose the intruder observes an exact match between this record and a known 
unit in the population. We make the no measurement error assumption so that there will 
be  k F  units in the population which potentially match the record. We also assume no 
response knowledge (see section 2.1). The probability that this observed match is correct 
is  
   Pr(correct | match exact , , ) 1/ k k match X k F F = =       (7) 
 
where  the  probability  distribution  is  with  respect  to  the  design  under  a  symmetric 
sampling scheme, such as simple random sampling or Bernoulli sampling. (Alternatively, 
it  could  be  with  respect  to  a  stochastic  mechanism  employed  by  the  intruder,  which 
selects any of the   k F  units with equal probability). This probability is conditional on the 
key value k and on  k F .   
In practice, we only observe the sample frequencies  k f  and not the  k F . We therefore 
integrate out over the uncertainty about  k F  and write the measure as  
 
Pr(correct | match exact , , ) (1/ | , 1) k k k match X k f E F k f = = =     (8) 
 
This expectation is with respect to both the sampling scheme and a model generating 
the  k F , such as the compound Poisson model in (6). An alternative measure, focusing on 
the risk from population uniqueness, is: 
 
Pr( 1| , 1) k k F k f = =           (9) 
 
The expressions in (8) and (9) may be generalized for any record in the microdata with 
1 k f > . A difference between the probabilities in (8) and (9) and those in the previous 
section is that here we condition on the record’s key value  X k = . Thus, although we 
might assume  | ( ) k k k F Po λ λ ∼ , as in (6), we should like to condition on the particular 
key value k  when considering the distribution of  k λ . Otherwise, if the  k λ  are identically 
distributed as in the previous section then we would obtain the same measure of risk for 
all (sample unique) records. A natural model is a log-linear model:  
 
log( ) k k z λ β =            (10) 
 
where k z   is  a  vector  of  indicator  variables  representing  the  main  effects  and  the 
interactions  between  the  key  variables  1,..., m X X   and  β   is  a  vector  of  unknown 
parameters.    14 
Expressions for the risk measures in (8) and (9) in terms of β are provided by Skinner 
and Holmes (1998) and Elamir and Skinner (2006). Assumptions about the sampling 
scheme are required to estimate  β . Under Bernoulli sampling with inclusion probability 
π , it follows from (6) that   | ( ) k k k f Po λ πλ ∼ . Assuming also (10),  β  may be estimated 
by  standard  maximum  likelihood  methods.  A  simple  extension  of  this  argument also 
applies under Poisson sampling where the inclusion probability  k π  may vary with respect 
to  the  key  variables,  for example  if a  stratifying  variable  is  included  among the  key 
variables. In this case, we have  | ( ) k k k k f Po λ π λ ∼ . Skinner and Shlomo (2008) discuss 
methods for the specification of the model in (10). Skinner (2007) discusses the possible 
dependence of the measure on the search method employed by the intruder.  
 
3.4. SDC methods 
In this section we summarize a number of SDC methods for survey microdata.  
Transformation  of  variables  to  reduce  detail.  Categorical  key  variables  may  be 
transformed, in particular, by combining categories. For example, the variable household 
size might be top coded by creating a single maximum category, such as 8+. Continuous 
key variables may be banded to form ordinal categorical variables by specifying a series 
of cut-points between which the intervals define categories.   The protection provided by 
combining categories of key variables can be assessed following the methods in sections 
3.2. and 3.3. See also Reiter (2005).  Provided the transformation is clear and explicit, 
this SDC method has the advantage that the reduction of utility is clear to the data user, 
who may suffer loss of information but the validity of analyses is not damaged.  
Stochastic  perturbation  of  variables.  The  values  of  potential  key  variables  are 
perturbed in a stochastic way.  In the case of continuous variables perturbation might 
involve the addition of noise, analogous to the addition of measurement error (Sullivan 
and Fuller, 1989; Fuller, 1993). In the case of categorical variables, perturbation may 
consist  of  misclassification,  termed  the  Post  Randomisation  Method  (PRAM)  by 
Gouweleeuw et al. (1998). Perturbation may be undertaken in a way to preserve specified 
features  of  the  microdata,  e.g.  the  means  and  standard  deviations  of  variables  in  the 
perturbed microdata may be the same as in the original microdata, but in practice there 
will inevitably be unspecified features of the microdata which are not reproduced. For 
example,  the  estimated  correlation  between  a  perturbed  variable  and  an  unperturbed 
variable will often be downwardly biased if an analyst uses the perturbed data but ignores 
the fact that perturbation has taken place. An alternative is to provide users with the 
precise  details  of  the  perturbation  method,  including  parameter  values  such  as  the 
standard deviation of the noise or the entries in the misclassification matrix, so that they 
may ‘undo’ the impact of perturbation when undertaking their analyses. See e.g. Van den 
Hout and Van der Heijden (2002) in the case of PRAM or Fuller (1993) in the case of 
added noise. In principle, this may permit valid analyses although there will usually be a 
loss of precision and the practical disadvantages are significant. 
Synthetic microdata: This approach is similar to the previous one, except that the aim 
is to avoid requiring special methods of analysis. Instead, the values of variables in the 
file are replaced by values generated from a model in a way that is designed for the 
analysis of the synthetic data, as if it were the true data, to generate consistent point 
estimates (under the assumption that the model is valid). The model is obtained from   15 
fitting  to  the  original  microdata.  In  order  to  enable  valid  standard  errors  as  well  as 
consistent point estimators, Raghunathan et al. (2003) propose that multiple copies of the 
synthetic microdata are generated in such a way that multiple imputation methodology 
can be used. See Reiter (2002) for discussion of complex designs.  Abowd and Lane 
(2004) discuss release strategies combining remote access to one or more such synthetic 
microdata  files  with  much  more  restricted  access  to  the  original  microdata  in  a  safe 
setting.  
Selective perturbation. Often concern focuses only on records deemed to be risky and 
it may be expected that utility will be greater if only a subset of risk records is perturbed. 
In  addition  to  creating  stochastically  perturbed  or  synthetic  values  for  only  targeted 
records, it is also possible just to create missing values in these records, called local 
suppression by Willenborg and de Waal (2001), or both to create missing values and to 
replace  these  by  imputed  values,  called  blank  and  impute  by  Federal  Committee  on 
Statistical Methodology  (2005). A major problem with such methods is that they are 
likely to create biases if the targetted values are unusual. The data user will typically not 
be able to quantify these biases, especially when the records selected for blanking depend 
on the values of the variable(s) which are to made missing.  Reiter (2003) discusses how 
valid inference may be conducted if multiple imputed values are generated in a specified 
way  for  the  selected  records.  He  refers  to  the  resulting  data  as  partially  synthetic 
microdata.  
Record Swapping. The previous methods focus on the perturbation of the values of 
the variables for all or a subset of records. The method of record swapping involves, 
instead, the values of one or more key variables being swapped between records. The 
choice of records between which values are swapped may be controlled so that certain 
bivariate  or  multivariate  frequencies  are  maintained  (Dalenius  and  Reiss,  1982)  in 
particular by only swapping records sharing certain characteristics (Willenborg and de 
Waal,  2001,  sect.  5.6).    In  general,  however,  it  will  not  be  possible  to  control  all 
multivariate relationships and record swapping may damage utility in an analogous way 
to misclassification (Skinner and Shlomo, 2007). Reiter (2005) discusses the impact of 
swapping on identification risk. 
Microaggregation. This method (Defays and Anwar, 1998) is relevant for continuous 
variables, such as in business survey microdata, and in its basic form consists of ordering 
the values of each variable and forming groups of a specified size k  (the first group 
contains the k smallest values, the second group the next k smallest values and so on). 
The method replaces the values by their group means, separately for each variable.  An 
advantage of the method is that the modification to the data will usually be greatest for 
outlying values, which might also be deemed the most risky. It is difficult, however, for 
the user to assess the biasing impact of the method on analyses. 
SDC methods will generally be applied after the editing phase of the survey, during 
which data may be modified to meet certain edit constraints. The application of some 
SDC methods may, however, lead to failure of some of these constraints. Shlomo and de 
Waal  (2006)  discuss  how  SDC  methods  may  be  adapted  to  take  account  of  editing 
considerations. 
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3.5 SDC for survey weights and other design information 
Survey weights and other complex design information are often released with survey 
microdata in order that valid analyses can be undertaken. It is possible, however, that 
such design information may contribute to disclosure risk. For example, suppose a survey 
is  stratified  by  a  categorical  variable  X  with  different  sampling  fractions  in  different 
categories of X.  Then, if the nature of the sampling design is published (as is common), it 
may be possible for the intruder to determine the categories of X from the survey weight. 
Thus, the survey design variable may effectively become a key variable. See de Waal and 
Willenborg (1997) and Willenborg and de Waal (2001, sect. 5.7) for further discussion of 
how survey weights may lead to design variables becoming key variables. Note that this 
does not imply that survey weights should not be released; it just means that disclosure 
risk assessments should take account of what information survey weights may convey.  
Willenborg and de Waal (2001, sect. 5.7.3) and Mitra and Reiter (2006) propose some 
approaches to adjusting weights to reduce risk.    
In addition to the release of survey weights, it is common to release either stratum or 
primary  sampling  unit  (PSU)  labels  or  replicate  labels,  to  enable  variances  to  be 
estimated. These labels will generally be arbitrary and will not, in themselves, convey 
any identifying information.  Nevertheless, as for survey weights, the possibility that they 
could be used to convey information indirectly needs to be considered. For example, if 
the PSUs are defined by areas for which public information is available, e.g. a property 
tax rate, and the microdata file includes area-level variables, then it is possible that these 
variables may enable a PSU to be linked to a known area.  As another example, suppose 
that a PSU is an institution, such as a school, then school level variables on the microdata 
file, such as the school enrolment size, might enable the PSU to be linked to a known 
institution.  Even for individual level microdata variables, it is possible that sample-based 
estimates of the total or mean of such variables for a stratum, say, could be matched to 
published values, allowing for sampling uncertainty.  
A standard simple approach to avoiding releasing PSU or replicate identifiers is to 
provide information on design effects or generalized variance functions instead. Such  
methods are often inadequate, however, for the full range of uses of survey microdata 
(Yung, 1997). Some possible more sophisticate approaches include the use of adjusted 
bootstrap  replicate  weights  (Yung,  1997),  adjusted  pseudo-replicates  or  pseudo  PSU 
identifiers (Dohrmann et al., 2002), or combined stratum variance estimators (Lu et al., 
2006). 
 
4. Conclusion 
The development of SDC methodology continues to be stimulated by a wide range of 
practical challenges and by ongoing innovations in the ways that survey data are used, 
with no signs of diminishing concerns about confidentiality. There has been a tendency 
for some SDC methods to be developed in somewhat ad hoc way to address specific 
problems and one aim of this paper has been to draw out some principles and general 
approaches  which  can  guide  a  more  unified  methodological  development.  Statistical 
modelling has provided one important framework for this purpose. Other fields with the 
potential to  influence  the  systematic  development  of  SDC  methodology  in  the future 
include data mining, in particular methods related to record linkage, and approaches to 
privacy protection in computer science and database technology.        17 
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